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I. Introduction: The Paradox of Law Reform
This essay explores the paradox of family law reform in common law
Canada, focusing particularly on reforms relating to family property and
inter-spousal support in the decades after the first federal Divorce Act of
1968. The paradox of this law reform activity is well-expressed in Carol
Smart's colourful phrase about the (lack of) impact of law reform for
women in the United Kingdom. In her view, while it is inaccurate to say
that nothing has been done to improve the position of women, it is equally
impossible to demonstrate that there has been any linear development of
progressive legislation; in such a context, Smart suggested that women
have been "running hard to stand still."'
* I am grateful to the Dean and faculty of Dalhousie Law School for inviting me to present
this paper as the Read Lecture 1993. 1 also warmly acknowledge the support of the Canadian
Bar Association Research Foundation, the research assistance of Judy Parrack, LL.B. and the
technical assistance of Hazel Pollack at Osgoode Hall Law School, as well as numerous
colleagues whose comments have encouraged me with this project, both in Canada and in
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
This paper is part of a larger project on family law reform processes in Canada. The focus
here on post-divorce economic relationships between married spouses is only part of the larger
problem of post-separation economic issues in many kinds of "family" relationships.
1. C. Smart, "Feminism and Law: Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy" (1986) 14 Int.
J. Sociol. Law 109 at 116. The idea of "running hard to stand still" was also used by Dorothy
Chunn and Joan Brockman in their analysis of gender bias in the legal system; see D. Chunn
& J. Brockman, "'Running Hard to Stand Still?'-Future Directions for Studying 'Gender
Bias' in Law" in J. Brockman & D. Chunn, eds., Investigating Gender Bias: Law, Courts and
the Legal Profession (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1993) 215.
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The idea that women (and children) are "running hard to stand still" in
the family law context suggests a need to focus careful attention on family
law reforms concerning property and inter-spousal support, reforms
which appear to have been designed to transform economic relationships
on marriage breakdown. From the law reform perspective, the past two
decades have witnessed an unprecedented flurry of reform activity about
issues of property and inter-spousal support: law reform commission
reports, federal and provincial legislative action,2 and significant judicial
decisions in both provincial appellate courts and in the Supreme Court of
Canada. Yet, in spite of so much law reform activity, we are confronted,
paradoxically, by a deluge of unremittingly tragic statistics about current
levels of poverty for women and children in Canada, poverty which has
been traced in part to marriage breakdown. According to the author of a
1992 report, for example:
the end of a marriage or common-law relationship increased the likelihood
of poverty substantially. For those who were married and had children, the
risk of poverty rose from 3.1 per cent to 37.6 per cent after divorce or
separation.... In 1982-86, the family income of women (adjusted for
changes in family size) dropped by an average of about 30 per cent in the
year after their marriage ended. In contrast, the family income of divorced
or separated men rose by an average of 12 per cent.
3
2. Following the enactment of comprehensive reform legislation concerning divorce in 1968
(the DivorceAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8), the federal law reform commission engaged in a project
on family law reform, as did a number of provincial law reform commissions. See Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Studies on FamilyPropertyLaw (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
By 1980, all nine common law provinces had enacted new legislation about property and
spousal support on marriage breakdown, and a number had also reformed custody and access
arrangements. A few years later, there was a "second wave" of family law reform initiatives,
when the federal government repealed and replaced the 1968 divorce legislation with the
DivorceAct, 1985, S.C. 1986, c. 4, legislation which included new provisions relating to inter-
spousal support. In the same year, Ontario repealed its 1978 legislation about property and
support, replacing it with the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3. In 1989, British Columbia
produced a law reform commission report recommending revisions to its property legislation
similar to those in existence in Ontario; see Law Reform Commission of British Columbia,
Working Paper on Property Rights on Marriage Breakdown (Vancouver: The Commission,
1989. Both the federal government and provincial governments have also enacted legislation
concerning the enforcement of support and custody orders, and Ontario recently amended its
enforcement legislation; see now Family Support Plan Act, 1991, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-28.
3. T. Lempriere, "A New Look at Poverty" (1992) 16 PCPT 18 at 19-20. These Canadian
statistics reflect similar, though less dramatic, income fluctuations for men and women at
marriage breakdown to those reported in L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (New York:
Free Press, 1985). According to Weitzman's research in California, men's income in the year
after divorce rose on average 73 per cent, while women's income in the same period declined
on average by 42 per cent. For further analysis of the economic impact of marriage breakdown
on women in Canada, see M.J. Mossman & M. MacLean, "Family Law and Social Welfare:
Toward a New Equality" (1985) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 79; and M. McCall, J. Hornick & J. Wallace,
The Process and Economic Consequences of Marriage Breakdown (Calgary: Canadian
Research Institute for Law and the Family, 1988).
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The paradox of so much law reform activity relating to property and
inter-spousal support after marriage breakdown, in conjunction with
significant levels of poverty for women and children in these circum-
stances, raises profound questions about law reform processes, both for
lawyers and others who regard law as a strategy for accomplishing social
change. Put another way, we need to ask whether we can really claim that
there has been "reform" of family law if "reform" means, as the dictionary
suggests, "improvement or change for the better"; or whether there has
been legal change, but not necessarily law "reform." Undoubtedly, the
late Horace Read's interest in law reform centred on reform as "improve-
ment" or "progress." Thus, in the context of this lecture in his honour, I
want to explore the real accomplishments of family law reform in Canada
in recent decades and to confront the question, from the perspective of
women and children, about whether we should regard it as "reform"; or
whether, on the other hand, it has merely resulted in some inconsequential
changes so that women and children are left "running hard to stand still."
This question about the efficacy of law reform for women and children
builds on feminist analyses about engagement with law. For feminists
and others who want to use law to accomplish change, especially
fundamental change, law reform efforts have often led to frustration.
Feminist reformers in particular have offered trenchant critiques of law's
"uneven development," suggesting that it both "facilitates change and is
an obstacle to change."4 In such a context, Audre Lorde's criticism that
"the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house"'5 seems
entirely apt. Other critics, agreeing with feminist reformers that law is
relatively powerless to effect fundamental change, have suggested that
because law is both constructed by and reflective of social relations, and
situated within society rather than an autonomous and abstracted entity
4. See Smart, supra note 1 at 117. For similar analyses, see J. Fudge, "The Effect of
Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence
in Canada" (1989) 17 Int'l J. Sociology L. 445; M.J. Mossman, "Feminism and Legal Method:
The Difference itMakes" (1986) 3 Aust. J.L. & Soc. 30; and C. Smart, Feminism andthePower
of Law (New York: Routledge, 1989).
5. Lorde continued: "They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they
will never enable us to bring about genuine change" (as quoted in M. Thornton, "Feminism and
the Contradictions of Law Reform" (1991) 19 Int'l . Sociology L. 453).
8 The Dalhousie Law Journal
outside social relations, it is inevitably "shaped by [social] forces... to
a far greater extent than it can shape them."6
Yet, in spite of accepting the strength of these criticisms, other scholars
have concluded that engagement with law reform processes is nonethe-
less necessary. For example, Margaret Thornton has argued that:
In light of the privileged status of law within our society, it cannot be
neglected or social relations will continue to be reproduced within legal
discourse as they always have been ... 7
Thornton has analyzed in detail the problems of liberal legal discourse,
its promises and limits, but argued nonetheless that informed engagement
with it remains necessary.' In the context of this essay about the paradox
of family law reform, I have similarly tried to avoid the more sweeping
claims of this debate about the role of law in accomplishing change.
Instead of concluding that law reform is neveruseful, or, by contrast, that
it offers a panacea for social problems, my objective here is to understand
how the law reform process has occurred in the family law context so that
problems can be identified, if not immediately eliminated. While such an
assessment may result in conclusions which are somewhat tentative and
ambiguous, it seems nonetheless essential to strategic decision-making
about family law reform for the future.
6. SeeR. Cotterrell, The Sociology ofLaw (London: Butterworths, 1984) at7O-71. Cotterrell
has also suggested that failure to understand law as just "one tool of directed social change"
could lead to "inevitable disillusionment when the legal instrument fails to achieve what the
legal reformer intended." For a similar analysis in the Australian context, see A. Ziegart, "The
Limits of Family Law: A Socio-Legal Assessment" (1984) 9 Leg. Serv. Bull. 257. As Ziegart
has argued (ibid. at 257-58):
It is worthwhile to be reminded of [the] congruence of social structures which the law
shares with society at large when looking at social change through law, rather than
assuming a special instrumental quality of the law which sets it apart from the social
system in which it operates.
Yet, although Ziegart concluded that law does not lend itself to an instrumental use for social
change, he nonetheless conceded (ibid. at 263) that "without the law, social change would not
be feasible."
7. Thornton, supranote5 at454. See also N. Lacey, "FeministLegal Theory" (1989)9 Oxford
J. Legal Stud. 383 at 385:
[A] 11 feminist scholars with an interest in law start out from the assumption that law has
an important, albeit not decisive, influence in constructing and maintaining social
relations. Thus most feminist legal scholars believe, though to very different degrees,
that law plays some part in consolidating, expressing, underpinning and supporting
existing power relations in societies, including those between women and men.
8. M. Thornton, The LiberalPromise (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). According
to Thornton, even though "legislation can practically deal with only the more excessive
manifestations of social power exercised over subordinates" and "in spite of its inability to
fulfil the unrealistic expectations that it transform our society ... [human rights] legislation
does serve an important symbolic and educative function" (ibid. at 261).
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II. Themes in Family Law Reform: Exploring the Paradox
A comprehensive review of family law reform in common law Canada in
the past two decades represents a complex research inquiry. 9 It might well
encompass a review of legislative actions and judicial decisions from
across the country, as well as the work of law reform commissions,
governmental inquiries and studies, and the briefs and submissions which
form part of legislative inquiries. Such an inquiry might also need to
include empirical research about the impact of applying current legal
principles to families involved in divorce, and measuring over a period of
time thereafter the continuing economic impact of the application of legal
rules. 10
In addition, because this issue of family law reform has been the focus
of reform activity in other common law jurisdictions, it is useful to assess
the research activity and reform proposals in the United States, Australia,
and the United Kingdom. Interesting comparisons may also be made with
civil law jurisdictions in North America and in Western Europe. Indeed,
a current project about family law reform in the European Community has
focused on comparisons between France and the United Kingdom (and
other countries) so that, as one important factor for comparison, the
research can try to assess the impact of common law principles and those
of the civil law on family law reform proposals." Moreover, research
about property and inter-spousal support may also need to take account
of related issues such as child support, custody and access, and child
support guidelines, all of which are linked to property and inter-spousal
support as different manifestations of economic issues at marriage
breakdown.
2
9. Some of the issues noted here have been addressed in my earlier reviews of family law
reform activities: for example, in relation to the United Kingdom and Australia, see M.J.
Mossman, Book Review of Maintenance After Divorce by J. Eekelaar & M. Maclean (1989-
90) 3 C.J.W.L. 293; in relation to the United States, see M.J. Mossman, Book Review of The
Divorce Revolution by L. Weitzman (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 341; MJ. Mossman, Book
Review of Abortion andDivorce in Western Law by M.A. Glendon (1989-90) 3 C.J.W.L. 650;
and in relation to Canada, see M.J. Mossman, "Re-Thinking the Feminization of Poverty"
(1990) 11:2 Jurisfemme 7.
10. The most comprehensive study of this kind was conducted by the Institute of Family
Studies in Melbourne, Australia. See P. McDonald, ed., Settling Up: Property and Income
Distribution on Divorce in Australia (Sydney: Prentice-Hall of Australia, 1986) [hereinafter
Settling Up].
11. See N. Lefaucheur, "Qui doit nourrir l'enfant?" (Paris: Travaux de Recherche et
d'Analyse sur le Social et la Sociabilit6, 1993).
12. See E. Zweibel & R. Shillington, ChildSupport Policy: Income Tax Treatment and Child
Support Guidelines (Toronto: Policy Research Centre on Children, Youth and Families, 1992);
and D. Pask, "The Effect on Maintenance of Custody Sharing" (1989) 3 C.J.W.L. 155.
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These issues are allimportant to an assessment of the paradox of family
law reform in Canada. Yet, if we are to confront the central issue, the
paradox of family law reform, we must delve underneath these issues to
examine the fundamental nature of law reform processes. In the context
of this lecture, I want to explore three aspects of law reform that have
profoundly shaped family law developments about property and inter-
spousal support, and that have also contributed to the paradox of family
law reform: (a) the constraints of the status quo, inherent in law reform
activities; (b) the significance of equality jurisprudence in the family law
context; and (c) the impact of the conceptual division of public and
private spheres in family law. In my view, these three themes must be
explored if we are to seriously confront the paradox of family law reform:
that after so much law reform activity, women and children at marriage
breakdown are nonetheless "running hard to stand still."
1. The constraints of the status quo on law reform activities
Because law reform processes usually occur within an existing legal
context and build on existing ideas, they more often promote incremental
rather than fundamental change. Law reform activity inherently confines
the extent of change and tends to reinforce the status quo. It is now clear
that, by making divorce (and remarriage) significantly more accessible,
the divorce legislation of 1968 created a new ethos about family dissolu-
tion and re-formation in Canada. However, law reform processes have
not really confronted the concomitant need for legal principles which
(re)arrange economic relationships so as to take account of a newly-
emerging pattern of "serial monogamy" in family life. The challenge to
do so is an extensive one, both for legal imagination and also for political
will. Yet, precisely because of the extent of the challenge, incremental
law reform processes may be less able to respond effectively. Thus, any
such assessment of the law reform process requires an examination of the
relationships among legal institutions and an appreciation of the institu-
tional forces which constrain some of them from more fundamental
decision-making. It is also important to examine the ways in which
institutional practices may encourage some voices, while limiting others,
in the family law context.
An example from the history of family property in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries shows the ways in which judicial principles were
interpreted so as to limit, rather than extend, women's rights to property,
and the further limitations imposed by subsequent judicial interpretation
of (arguably fundamental) reform legislation. Thus, the nineteenth cen-
tury common law principle of the unity of husband and wife, a principle
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that precluded women from property ownership after marriage, 3 was
moderated in practice by judicial recognition of the equitable family
settlement. Equitable family settlements were generally recognized by
the courts so that wives could enjoy the beneficial interest in property, so
long as there was an express trust agreement.1 4 In this way, courts seemed
to be receptive to extending property rights to married women.
Yet these reform efforts were also inevitably constrained by the
judicial context in which they operated. On closer examination, it is clear
that an equitable property settlement enforced by a court operated quite
consistently with the common law principle of unity of husband and wife
in marriage; it did not confront the existing principle or challenge it
directly. As Norma Basch has described it, "equity merely carved out
exceptions; it did not overturn the basic common law model."''5 Thus the
equitable reform was shaped within and by the common law principles:
"A married woman with separate property in equity did not have the same
proprietary status as a man or an unmarried woman. Rather, she enjoyed
a special status, having rights with respect to certain property only.'
6
Moreover, a second limiting principle of the equitable property settle-
ment reforms is evident from the context of judicial decision-making in
such cases. Because litigation was often expensive, it seems clear that
only relatively wealthy women had access to legal expertise to create such
settlements and, if necessary, to defend their rights pursuant to them in
court actions. Thus, the application of the benefit of equitable reforms
was limited to those with relatively greater access to financial resources.17
In the more general context of family law reform, the limited access of
less wealthy persons to courts may mean that principles are established
13. For an excellent account of "coverture," see M.E. Doggett, Marriage, Vfe-Beating and
the Law in Victorian England (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
14. See L. Holcombe, Vives and Property: Reform of the Married Women's Property Law
in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
15. N. Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: IVomen, Marriage and Property in Nineteenth Century
New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) at 230.
16. According to Holcombe, this comment regarded women as in a somewhat privileged
position, continuing thus: "and she escaped some of the liabilities attaching to property
generally. As one lawyer expressed it, 'married women... are allowed in Chancery the benefit,
without the responsibility, of property"' (Holcombe, supra note 14 at 44-45 quoting from
U.K., H.C., "Special Report from the Select Committee on the Married Women's Property
Bill" No. 441 in Sessional Papers (1867-68) vol. 7, 6, 9).
17. According to one estimate, "marriage settlements in equity applied to only one-tenth of
the marriages in [England]"; see Holcombe, supra note 14 at 46, quoting "Married Women and
Their Property" 41 Spectator 488 at 488 and U.K., H.L., Parliamentary Debates, 3d. ser., vol.
142, col. 401 atcol. 410 (1856). Despite the low proportion ofmarriages overal which adopted
the equitable settlement arrangement, the figure often percent suggests that the settlement was
used quite frequently by the most wealthy married couples in England.
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in the context of well-to-do family units, but that their utility for poorer
families may be much less apparent.
This criticism of judicial principles may seem a familiar one about the
class bias of legal processes in general. Nevertheless, it needs to be
addressed particularly closely in the context of the substantial amount of
family law reform in Canada in recent decades, reform which may have
actually exacerbated the poverty of women and children.18 To what extent
may the courts' (some courts?) lack of experience with families who are
poor contribute to the acceptance of legal principles which have singu-
larly failed to take into account in any meaningful way the needs and
circumstances of less wealthy families?
As the historical example shows, however, legislative changes also do
not occur in a vacuum. There is now substantial evidence that the statutes
enacted in North American jurisdictions in the late nineteenth century
concerning property rights for married women took as their starting point
the then current legal and equitable principles. Moreover, there is also
growing support for the view that legislation was enacted most often for
the purpose of strengthening economic stability for families with prop-
erty in the face of financial difficulties and uncertainty, not so as to
challenge societal conventions by advancing the status of women. Ac-
cording to Basch, the reform statutes were generally quite conservative,
meeting "limited feminist goals" while functioning as "significant instru-
ments of social stability by making some accommodations for women
without significantly overturning the pyramid of male power."'19 There
18. For critiques about access to justice, particularly for disadvantaged persons (including
women), see M.J. Mossman (with H. Ritchie), "Access to Civil Justice: A Review of Canadian
Legal Academic Scholarship 1977-1987" in A. Hutchinson, ed., Access to Civil Justice
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 53; M.J. Mossman, "'Shoulder to Shoulder': Gender and Access to
Justice" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 351; and M.J. Mossman, "Gender Equality and
Legal Aid Services" (1993) 15 Sydney L. Rev. 30.
19. Basch, supra note 15 at 227. According to Basch, there were three motivations for the
enactment of the statutes about married women's property in New York. One was the need to
accommodate structural changes in the economy within the legal system, creating clear and
unambiguous legal rights for married women (rather than the uncertain patchwork developed
in equity) so as to encourage and support the burgeoning commercial interests in the state. A
second motivation was political, the need to extend to the wives of middle class professionals
the benefits of equitable arrangements previously restricted to those who were very wealthy.
The third motivation was "the woman question," but Basch has argued persuasively that this
factor alone would not have achieved this legislated legal reform. The recent biographical
studies of two of the major proponents of married women's property reform (and suffrage) in
New York (and beyond) confirm the difficulty experienced by women seeking reform of
married women's property. See K. Barry, Susan B. Anthony: A Biography of a Singular
Feminist (New York: New York University Press, 1988); and E. Griffith, In Her Own Right:
The Life of Elizabeth Cady Stanton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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have been similar conclusions about Canadian provincial legislative
reforms concerning married women's property.
20
In addition to the limiting scope of statutory reforms, it is also
important to note the impact of judicial interpretation in achieving (or not
achieving) legislative purposes. In the historical context, it seems that
judges most often used the principles of common law and equity as the
starting point for their analysis of legislative reforms, confining the scope
of intended reforms accordingly.21 Thus, even when legislation arguably
departs fundamentally from existing legal principles, its interpretation by
courts may constrain the extent to which reform goals will be achieved.
Such a process confirms that the starting point for analysis in both courts
and legislatures is often the status quo; and that even when proposed
changes may have been designed to accomplish substantive or funda-
mental reforms, legislation may be interpreted within existing paradigms
which ensure continuity rather than fundamental change.
These ideas about inherent limits in the law reform process are also
revealed in the more recent family law reform context after 1968.
Arguably, the most important catalyst for legislative change concerning
family property was the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973
in Murdoch v. Murdoch.22 Irene Murdoch separated from her husband in
1968 after 25 years of marriage, claiming both spousal support and also
a declaration that her husband, who held title to all the family property,
was a trustee for her of an undivided one-half interest on the basis that they
were equal partners. At trial, the court concluded that the indicia of
partnership were missing, and awarded her monthly financial support.
Her appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal was denied.3 In the Supreme
Court of Canada, her appeal was based on the doctrine of resulting trust
rather than partnership, and the majority of the court concluded that the
doctrine could not apply because Irene Murdoch was unable to show that
20. See C. Backhouse, "Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-Century Canada"
(1988) 6 Law & HisL Rev. 211.
21. See Basch, supra note 15 at230: "The evidence found in treatises, legislative debates and
appellate cases suggests that ... the old common law fiction of marital unity inhibited the
reform of marital property law." See also Backhouse, supra note 20.
22. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423 [hereinafter Murdoch].
23. The appeal court held that she could not succeed in her property claim because she has
been accepting the monthly support payments in the interim, concluding that "the real
adjudication in respect of [support] was inextricably related to and dependant upon the fact that
there was to be no division of the property"; thus, having taken advantage of the decision at trial,
she could not succeed on appeal. While such principles are frequently applied by courts to
achieve fairness between parties, their application in the family law context clearly disadvan-
tages the spouse without alternative means of support, and especially (and ironically) where
a spouse is challenging the correctness of a trial decision.
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she and her husband had adopted a "common intention" that property
accumulated during the marriage was to be jointly shared.24
In his majority judgment, however, Mr. Justice Martland also reiter-
ated the trial judge's conclusion that the work done by Irene Murdoch
during the twenty-five years of her marriage was merely the "work done
by any ranch wife."25 It was this statement, coupled with the denial of her
claim to any interest in the property which, in retrospect, seems to have
been the major catalyst for legislative reform. As the Toronto Star noted
in an editorial at the time, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
represented both "a warning to women and a cue to legislators." Citing
recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, the
editorial suggested that law reform was obviously needed to prevent other
"Irene Murdochs [from being] left out in the cold with less than $60 a
week to show for a quarter-century of labour. '26 This sense of injustice
was also subsequently reflected in the analysis and recommendations of
the federal Law Reform Commission in its study of family property in
24. At the time of the Murdoch decision in the Supreme Court of Canada, there were
numerous and somewhat conflictingjudgments in both Canada and the United Kingdom about
the application of the doctrine of resulting trustto family situations. In Thompson v. Thompson,
[1961] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 13-14, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada had clearly stated its
view that "no case has yet held that, in the absence of some financial contribution, the wife is
entitled to a proprietary interest from the mere fact of marriage and cohabitation and the fact
the property in question is the matrimonial home." In Murdoch, the majority also distinguished
the few cases in which a non-financial, but nonetheless valuable, contribution had been made
by spouses to the acquisition of property because the claims of the non-titled spouse in those
cases were directed only to interests in the matrimonial home. By contrast, Irene Murdoch's
claim was directed to all the property accumulated during the marriage. For other approaches
to the issue, see Trueman v. Trueman (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 109 (Alta. C.A.); Gissing v.
Gissing, [1970] 2 All E.R. 780 (H.L.); and Pettit v. Pettit, [1969] 2 All E.R. 385 (H.L.).
25. The work consisted of: "Haying, raking, swathing, moving, driving trucks and tractors
and teams, quietening horses, taking cattle back and forth to the reserve, dehorning, vaccinat-
ing, branding, anything that was to be done. I worked with him,just as a man would, anything
that was to be done" (Murdoch, supra note 22 at 360 [emphasis added]). For an analysis of
Murdoch and later cases, see J. McCamus & L. Taman, "Rathwell v. Rathwell: Matrimonial
Property, Resulting and Constructive Trusts" (1978) 16 Osgoode Hall L.J. 741.
26. I acknowledge the excellent help provided by Jeremy Webber in locating this media
material about the Murdoch decision. See also The Globe and Mail which suggested that $200
per month was "not much for a lifetime of work," and Chatelaine magazine which claimed in
January 1974 that the Murdoch decision was a chilling warning for women that "the Supreme
Court protects males but not females."
The reference is to Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, Report of the
Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970)
(Chair: Florence Bird) [hereinafter Report]. The Report recommended that the law should
recognize the "concept of equal partnership in marriage" in terms of property entitlement. For
further analysis of the Report from the perspective of the 1990's, see E. Abner, M.J. Mossman
& E. Pickett, "No More than Simple Justice: Assessing the Royal Commission Report on
Women, Poverty and the Family" (1990) 22 Ottawa L. Rev. 573.
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1975. Acknowledging the importance of the Murdoch case in creating a
climate for reform of family property principles, the report declared that
it was necessary to devise a property regime which would "promote
equality of the sexes before the law."27 Thus, with the support of "public
opinion" and law reform commissions (provincial as well as federal), the
legislative agenda in all the common law provinces embraced the idea of
"family property" arrangements at marriage breakdown.
2
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With hindsight, the problems are singularly apparent. An initial
problem, one which mirrors that of the nineteenth century reforms, is the
extent to which the Court's analysis in Murdoch represented only
incremental, not fundamental, change to existing legal principles. Al-
though the doctrine of constructive trust proposed in the dissenting
judgment of Mr. Justice Laskin is usually regarded as an extension of
traditional legal principles, it does not challenge fundamental legal ideas
about the roles of men and women in marriage. Thus, it was not the
marriage per se which resulted in Irene Murdoch's entitlement in his
view, but rather her extraordinary activities beyond those done by most
wives, indeed, activities usually done by men:
A Court with equitable jurisdiction is on solid ground in translating into
money's worth a contribution of labour by one spouse to the acquisition of
property taken in the name of the other, especially when such labour is
not simply housekeeping, which might be said to be merely a reflection
27. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 2, Research Papers at 3. The study
paper explored the problems of property rights on marriage breakdown and identified four
problems with the legal principles in the Murdoch case. One of the problems (discussed ibid.,
Research Papers at 271) was the lack of congruence between the legal principles and "the
attitudes, desires and expectations of a substantial majority of Canadians ... ; [the legal
principles were] out of step with contemporary views of marriage." In reaching this conclusion,
the report quoted (ibid.) from a Canada-wide Gallup Poll on the question: "Where the man has
been the chief wage earner in the family, do you think he should or should not have to share
equally with his wife any assets accumulated during their marriage, if the two decide to
separate?" Out of 1044 persons interviewed, 63 percent responded that the man should have
to share with his wife, 23 percent said that it depended on "circumstances" and 10 percent
responded that he should not have to share. The study paper concluded that "the present law
gives inadequate effect to the 'our property' concept which many couples have at least in regard
to some property" (ibid., Research Papers at 272).
28. See Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. M-9; Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C.
1979,c. 121;MaritalPropertyAct, S.M. 1978, c. 24, C.C.S.M., c. M-45;MatrimonialProperty
Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. M-I.I;Matrimonial Property Act, S.N.S. 1980, c. 9; Family LawReform
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152; Family Law Reform Act, S.P.E.I. 1978, c. 6; Matrimonial Property
Act, S.S. 1979, c. M-6.1. See also A. Bissett-Johnson & W. Holland, eds., Matrimonial
Property Law in Canada (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1980).
For information on matrimonial property in Quebec during the same period, see J. Pineau
& D. Burman, Effets du Mariage etRigimes Matrimoniaux, 3d ed. (Montreal: Thmis, 1984).
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of the marriage bonds .... The Court is not being asked in this case to
declare an interest in the appellant merely because she is a wife and
mother... 29
In declaring that Irene Murdoch was entitled to share in the property of
the marriage, Mr. Justice Laskin was thereby recognizing her extraordi-
nary contribution to the marriage, notherrole as a partnerto the marriage.
Within traditional legal principles, only work which could be performed
for money-usually work outside the home-could be regarded as
equivalent to a monetary contribution to the acquisition of property. In
this way, even the dissenting decision essentially represents continuity
within the legal tradition even as it does "justice" in the particular
circumstances of the case.
The availability of constructive trust doctrines to create shares in
family property for cohabitees has consistently taken account of "extraor-
dinary" work on the part of women making such claims; providing wifely
and household services has not generally been regarded as sufficient to
invoke the doctrine. In the Supreme Court of Canada's 1993 decision in
Peter v. Beblow, however, the majority decision of Madam Justice
McLachlin expressed clearly that the idea that "housewife" services were
provided by women in cohabiting relationships without expectation of
compensation was a "pernicious" idea.30 In that case, however, the
cohabiting woman had worked both inside and outside the home, making
a modest financial contribution to the household through part time work
as well. Thus, the extent to which this case has really extended the
principles about sharing in family property in cohabiting relationships
remains somewhat unclear, despite the Court's strong language criticiz-
ing the defendant's expectations that the woman's work should not result
in compensation but should simply be done for "love. 31 Clearly, if the
entitlement of cohabitees to share in property depends on "outside" work,
such a principle does not recognize traditional work done by women in
families; only when women do "men's work" can their contribution be
recognized.
By contrast with the position of cohabitees, the entitlement of married
couples to share in accumulated family property was defined in terms of
contributions to the marriage which have usually been deemed to be
equal.32 In this respect, the work of federal and provincial law reform
commissions seems to have influenced the legislative agenda in signifi-
29. Murdoch, supra note 22 at 451 [emphasis added].
30. Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980.
31. Ibid. at989-90, 993.
32. See, for example, Ontario's Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, s. 5(7).
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cant ways. Yet, even in this context, the law reform process shows
inherent flaws. In the first place, the availability of extensive family
property holdings at marriage breakdown, as existed in theMurdoch case,
probably represents only a minority of divorce cases in Canada. Thus,
although Irene Murdoch's financial resources may have been strained,
the prospect of sharing in her husband's more extensive property hold-
ings made it feasible to appeal all the way to the highest court. Arguably,
the Court's principles (along with the subsequent law reform commission
reports) were considerably influenced by the fact situation in Murdoch
and thus, they paid little heed to the more modest circumstances of many
divorcing couples, who may havejoint property interests which are much
less valuable. Because the parties before the court in Murdoch (at least,
taking them as a couple) had relatively more resources than average
family units in Canada, the Court's law reform efforts may be less useful
in families with more modest situations.3
Moreover, it is not just that the principles may not be applicable to
average families, but also that complementary principles (such as inter-
spousal support) may be affected, or that more useful principles for
average families may not be developed at all.34 The erosion of spousal
support for women at marriage breakdown after the adoption of legisla-
tive principles about property sharing clearly meant that women in
families with little or no property at divorce would share equally in
property (but one-half of little or nothing is not much) and that they would
also be entitled to only limited spousal support. The idea of sharing the
property equally seemed to obviate the need to consider future needs of
spouses, even when they had been out of the workforce for a long time or
when they had custody of small children. Indeed, the legislation about
family property spawned a considerable amount of litigation about the
definition of "property" in the statutes, not because such a philosophical
idea has any intrinsic interest but because things such as professional
33. For a detailed analysis of the average age at divorce, the average length of marriage and
some data on financial circumstances, see Mossman & MacLean, supra note 3. See also D.
McKie, B. Prentice & P. Reed, Divorce: Law and the Family in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 1983); and Department of Justice, Evaluation of the Divorce Act: Phase II: Monitor-
ing and Evaluation (Ottawa: The Department, 1990).
34. The interpretation of principles may also be affected by "extraneous" factors. In
Saskatchewan, for example, the courts developed the judicial principle of "capital base theory"
to protect the viability of large farm properties in the face of equal sharing principles required
by the provincial legislation at divorce. The theory was eliminated by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Farr v. Farr, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 252. See also J.E. Keet, "The Law Reform Process,
Matrimonial Property, and Farm Women: A Case Study of Saskatchewan 1980-1986" (1990)
4 C.J.W.L. 166.
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qualifications represented a means of sharing a valuable family "re-
source" which was otherwise not available for distribution.35
In this context, the work of law reform commissions in Canada seems
to have been limited to a policy analysis approach, only quite seldom
extending to empirical research about the operation of legal principles in
practice in relation to divorcing couples. Generally created in the 1960s
and 1970s, law reform commissions in common law jurisdictions have
been described as filling "the vacuum between the retreat of the creative
judiciary and the unresponsiveness of the legislative bodies. '36 Indeed, it
was the influential work by the federal Law Reform Commission and by
similar provincial commissions in the 1970s that resulted in the provin-
cial legislation about property sharing for married partners at divorce.
Unfortunately, follow-up research did not occur, at least in any system-
atic fashion, in Canada after the enactment of provincial legislation. By
contrast, the Australian Institute of Family Studies established a research
project to monitor the impact of its family law reform legislation, enacted
in 1975; ten years later, the Institute had significant data about the
practical impact of legislative principles concerning property and support
on divorcing spouses, data which was useful both for assessing the
problems and for designing solutions.3 7 Especially in the context of the
economic impact of property and support principles, such information
about the financial well-being of spouses in the years after divorce offers
35. Many of these cases were litigated in Ontario: see Corless v. Corless (1987), 5 R.F.L. (3d)
256 (U.F.C.); Caratun v. Caratun (1992), 42 R.F.L. (3d) 113 (Ont. C.A.); Keast v. Keast
(1986), 1 R.F.L. (3d) 401 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); and Linton v. Linton (1990), 30 R.F.L. (3d) 1 (Ont.
C.A.). In Nova Scotia, such litigation occurred in the context of defining pensions as property:
see Clarke v. Clarke, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 795.
36. M. Kirby, "Change andDecay orChange and Renewal" inM. Kirby, ed.,Reform the Law:
Essays on the Renewal of the Australian Legal System (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1983) 1 at 12. Foramore limited view of law reform efforts, see the essays in A. Erh-Soon Tay
& E. Kamenka, Law-Making in Australia (Melbourne: Edward Arnold, 1980), especially at
24-25:
Legal philosophers naturally spend much of their time looking for or discussing,
distinguishing and defining characteristics of law in general. They seek a concept of
justice, of law, of a legal system, they speak of the nature and the function of law. It is
easy, in such a context, to ignore or pass over Iightly the competing and conflicting
demands made on law, the tensions within a legal system, the variety of functions it
serves, the contraries it embodies, the extent to which its working depends on a wider
social, moral, political and economic context. Lawyers can do their work effectively
only by knowing their limitations, by not constantly seeking to govern the whole range
of human actions or pandering to the false view so widespread today-the view that, if
there is a social inequity, a social problem, a personal unhappiness, there must be a law
which it is not beyond the wits of man [sic] to devise that would fix it.
37. See Settling Up, supra note 10.
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an indispensable guide to needed changes. Clearly, and just as impor-
tantly, they show the limits of law reform initiatives which assume the
existence of property when there is likely to be none.
Thus, the family law reform process relating to property principles
suggests that resistance to fundamental change is inherent in the process
itself. For this reason, most changes are incremental at best, building on
existing legal principles without challenging their underlying assump-
tions, and thereby reinforcing current patterns of entitlements. In the
family law reform process, moreover, this problem is exacerbated by
assumptions, derived from those cases litigated by relatively more
wealthy family units, that most divorcing partners have significant
property for equal sharing; by contrast, if most divorces involve family
units with little or no property (especially after payment of legal fees),
such a principle has no practical utility. In this context, moreover, law
reform commissions in Canada have not undertaken much empirical
research which might challenge these accepted views about the availabil-
ity of property for sharing. Thus, the potential for law reform commis-
sions to challenge current legal principles has been seriously eroded.
2. The signiflcance of equality jurisprudence in the context of
family law reform
In the past two decades, family law reform in Canada and in other
common law jurisdictions has occurred in a political context in which
gender equality has been an increasingly contested issue, although there
has been little agreement about the content of the equality objective and
even less about the strategies for achieving it. For example, when Lenore
Weitzman documented the inequitable results for women in the context
of California's no-fault divorce law in the 1970s, she nonetheless con-
cluded that the equality goals of the legislation were satisfactory and that
the problem was that "the means used to achieve them were not in all ways
appropriate.""3 In the context of this conclusion, she recommended
additional law reforms to achieve "fairness, equity and equality" in the
38. Weitzman, supra note 3 at401.
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legal process, asserting that the process of law reform is one of "continu-
ous correction and refinement."39
By contrast with Weitzman's positive view of the potential for law
reform to address equality issues in families, others have expressed much
less confidence in the utility of equality ideas to achieve substantive
family law reforms. Isabel Marcus's assessment of New York divorce
reforms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led her to conclude that
both reform processes reflected the social construction of gender roles
and failed to achieve real gender equality; as she asserted, "gender free
or even gender neutral divorce law in a gendered society is an oxymo-
ron. '40 Similarly, Martha Fineman' s detailed analysis of the divorce law
reform process in Wisconsin in the late 1970s clearly identified the ways
in which reformers' adoption of formal equality goals impeded their
ability to accomplish reforms which would ameliorate the dire economic
circumstances of many women at divorce;41 in this way, the reform
process accomplished goals which were more symbolic than real. In her
more recent work, moreover, Fineman has extended her analysis of the
negative impact of equality ideas to other areas of family law reform,
suggesting that equality rhetoric has impeded the goals of substantive
gains for women at marriage breakdown:
During the past several decades, as in many areas, "equality" has become
the normative standard in family law for reform.... I criticize [such]
divorce reform efforts... because I believe they have had a detrimental
impact on many women and children. Developments in this area illustrate
that reformers can and often do create new, even more complex difficulties
through the ill-considered strategies they seem inevitably to employ when
using the law to attempt to construct a more ideal society. The rhetoric [of
equality] defines, and confines, the reform.42
39. Ibid. On the basis of the problems identified by her study of existing legal arrangements,
she proposed a number of changes to ameliorate the most serious problems of injustice: the
need for better child support arrangements, the need to amend the law's expectations of "long-
married, older housewives," the need to accommodate mothers with custody of children, and
the need for appropriate legal measures to take account of the complex needs of middle-aged
divorcing women (those with some experience in the workforce but for whom their families'
need had always taken priority over career development). For critiques of Weitzman, see M.
Fineman, "Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce Revolution" [1986] A.B.A. Research J.
781; and Mossman, Book Review of The Divorce Revolution by L. Weitzman, supra note 9.
40. I. Marcus, "Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law
Reform in New York" (1987-88) 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 55.
41. M. Fineman, "Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A
Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce" [1983] Wis.
L. Rev. 789.
42. M. Fineman, The Illusion of Equality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 2.
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Thus, in the context of American family law reform, Fineman's view is
that equality goals have not only failed to achieve substantive equality,
but they have even contributed in some circumstances to worsening
economic conditions for women and children.
The idea of equality has been significant in family law reform in
Canada also. Murdoch was litigated in the Supreme Court of Canada only
a few years before the claims of Jeannette Lavell and Irene Bedard
concerning the interpretation of section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act.
Interestingly, both claims related to entitlement to property interests
which flowed from Indian status under the Act, although the property
aspects of their claims were not significant in the arguments about the
interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights.43 The equality idea was also
very evident in the work of law reform commissions responding to the
Murdoch case. As the federal Law Reform Commission report stated:
The need for some fundamental reorganization of the existing property
laws ... regulating the rights and obligations of family members was
underlined in the recent decision.., in [Murdoch]. The public reaction to
that decision clearly indicates that the existing laws discriminate to the
prejudice of the married woman and are no longer acceptable in contem-
porary society. A property regime must be devised that will promote
equality of the sexes before the law.' 4
In the provincial legislation enacted in response to Murdoch between
1978 and 1980, the equality principle was central to determinations about
spousal entitlement to share in family property. The "second wave"
legislation enacted in Ontario in 1986 also clearly provided that the
purpose of the property sections of the Act was to recognize that:
child care, household management and financial provision are the joint
responsibilities of the spouses and that inherent in the marital relation-
ship there is equal contribution, whether financial or otherwise, by the
spouses to the assumption of these responsibilities .... 41
43. See A.G. Canada v. Lavell; Isaac v. Bedard, [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
44. Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 2, Research Papers at 3. The study paper
identified four problems with the legal principles evident in the Murdoch case: one was the lack
of congruence between the legal principles and "the attitudes, desires and expectations of a
substantial majority of Canadians" (supra note 27). The report also adopted equality language,
concluding (ibid., Working Paper at 41) that each partner should be entitled to "an equal
participation in the financial gains of [the] marriage": "We associate ourselves with the concept
of equality before the law for married persons of both sexes and believe that it is the coherence
and justice inherent in the concept of equality that gives the true substance to the argument that
there is a need for significant change in the law governing family property relations" (ibid.,
Working Paper at 3). See also Law Reform Commission of Ontario, Report on Family Law,
Part IV: Family Property Law (Ottawa: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1974) at 49ff.
45. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, s. 5(7) [emphasis added].
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By contrast with the property provisions of this legislation, however,
entitlement to inter-spousal support has generally been defined by the
statutes so that a dependent spouse must demonstrate both financial need
and also the availability of financial resources on the part of the paying
spouse. Because these statutory provisions have been interpreted in the
context of a concept of financial self-sufficiency for former spouses,
inter-spousal support has diminished on the assumption that husbands
and wives are equally able to be self-supporting at divorce. Thus, even
though the concept of equality is not so apparent in the context of inter-
spousal support, by contrast with property entitlement, the idea of
equality has nonetheless been a significant factor in determining entitle-
ment to spousal support.
The use of equality ideas for determining entitlement to support were
most evident in the Supreme Court of Canada's "trilogy" of decisions in
1987. In Pelech, Richardson and Caron,46 the court considered applica-
tions to vary spousal support where the former wives were in need after
signing support agreements which, for various reasons (including illness
and the inability to find work), had proven inadequate to meet their
financial needs some time later. In carefully considered reasons, Madam
Justice Wilson declined to order variation in all three cases on the basis
that none of the applicants had shown that there had been a "radical
change in circumstances flowing from an economic pattern of depen-
dency engendered by the marriage."4 7 Thus, the former wives and
46. Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 [hereinafter Pelech]; Richardson v. Richardson,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 [hereinafter Richardson]; and Caron v. Caron, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892
[hereinafter Caron]. For a discussion of the cases concerning causal connection after the
trilogy, see C.J. Rogerson, 'The Causal Connection Test in Spousal Support Law" (1989) 8
Can. J. Fam. L. 95.
47. See Pelech, supra note 46 at 851. As Madam Justice Wilson explained, such a principle
ensures that parties will be free to make their own agreements and create a "clean break":
Absent some causal connection between the changed circumstances and the marriage,
it seems to me that parties who have declared their relationship at an end should be taken
at their word. They made the decision to marry and they made the decision to terminate
their marriage. Their decisions should be respected. They should thereafter be free to
make new lives for themselves without an ongoing contingent liability for future
misfortunes which may befall the other. It is only, in my view, where the future
misfortune has its genesis in the fact of the marriage that the court should be able to
override the settlement of their affairs made by the parties themselves.
In Richardson, Mr. Justice La Forest dissented from the application of the Pelech principle to
the facts in Richardson, including the fact that Mrs. Richardson had been out of the workforce
to care for her children for several years and that she had also worked part time rather than full
time during some years of the marriage. In this way, Mr. Justice La Forest argued that her
dependency was connected to the marriage relationship, a view not shared by Madam Justice
Wilson for the majority.
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husbands were regarded as equally able to be financially self-sufficient
after marriage breakdown. As Martha Bailey has stated so firmly,
however, the "clean break" philosophy of these cases fails to acknowl-
edge the substantive inequality between former wives and husbands:
The clean break philosophy relieves men, who are almost always the
payors, from continuing support obligations, and enables them to form
(and abandon) new relationships without ongoing financial burdens.
Women are disadvantaged by the emphasis on self-sufficiency and a clean




In spite of these criticisms, the equality idea enshrined in the court's
standard of self-sufficiency for former spouses at marriage breakdown
seems to have diminished the availability of inter-spousal support. The
1990 Department of Justice study49 of divorce files over five years
demonstrated that spousal support was increasingly rarely requested and
even more rarely granted, "despite the fact that women reported they
earned 69 per cent of men's earnings in 1988, and 64 per cent of men's
earnings in 1986.,,50 As Carol Rogerson concluded in her study of the
awards of spousal support:
48. M. Bailey, "Pelech, Caron, and Richardson" (1989-90) 3 C.J.W.L. 615 at 626. Bailey
provides a compelling analysis of the nattre of gender inequality in contract bargaining in the
family law context, specifically addressing Madam Justice Wilson's concerns that it would be
paternalistic and reinforce stereotypical views of women if gender inequality per se were held
to be a sufficient reason for setting aside a "voluntary" contract. As Bailey suggested (ibid. at
629), it would be preferable to take account of
the relative poverty of the wife at the time of execution [of the contract], which is present
in virtually every reported decision on domestic contract variation, [and view] contract
terms falling below the norm... as satisfying the two-fold unconscionability test of
inequality and unfairness.... This approach would be responsive to the particular
circumstances of each case while recognizing systemic gender inequality, would
reframe the issue as other than one of the wife's emotional or psychological frailty, and
would lay claim to a societal interest in a certain standard of fairness in domestic
contracts, while preserving some finality.
See also B. Cossman, "A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality"
(1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 303; and D. Majury, "Unconscionability in an Equality Context"
(1990-91) 7 Can. Fam. L.Q. 123.
49. See Department of Justice, supra note 33.
50. "Women, Kids Driven into Poverty by Low Awards underDivorceAct"Lawyers' Weekly
(31 August 1990) 1,23. According to this report, court files examined in the study revealed that
"women requested support in only 16 per cent of the applications, and were awarded support
in only 6 per cent of all cases in 1988." Those who did not ask for support explained that:
" they felt self-sufficient (54 percent)
" they didn't need it (9 percent)
" they didn't believe in it (10 percent)
" they wanted a "clean break" (14 percent)
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often the amounts of support awarded provide at best a very modest
income, given the absence of other substantial sources of income, and in
almost all cases the final income position of former wives is significantly
lower than that of their former husbands.
51
Rogerson also found "a disturbing pattern of contracts negotiated by
lawyers which [were] less favourable to women than what the client could
have obtained in court," suggesting that lawyers had assumed a model of
inter-spousal support in which self-sufficiency was even more important
than in the statutes and judicial decisions.
Thus, in the family law reform context, it seems clear that the equality
concept adopted is one of formal, not substantive equality. The idea of
formal equality treats husbands and wives as similarly situated with
respect to financial self-sufficiency at marriage breakdown, and does not
take account of actual differences in employability (because of years out
of the workforce for child care responsibilities), differences in earning
capacity (especially where skills may have atrophied by time out of the
paid workforce), or future problems of balancing child-raising with full
time employment (especially for wives who have more frequent custody
of children). Moreover, it is striking that the Supreme Court of Canada
adopted a concept of formal equality for spouses at marriage breakdown
in the trilogy only two years before its major equality decision inAndrews
v. The Law Society ofBritish Columbia,52 a 1989 decision that recognized
the limits of the "similarly situated" test and incorporated the idea of
comparative "disadvantage" into the idea of equality. As Lynn Smith has
argued, the Andrews decision represented a significant departure for
Canadian equality jurisprudence and the opportunity for disadvantaged
groups, including women, to use the Charter to accomplish real reform.53
Yet, while it is possible to argue that women's claims to substantive
equality have sometimes achieved success in the courts, especially after
the Andrews decision, it is more difficult to make such assertions in the
family law context, even though most of the provincial statutes incorpo-
rate equality standards, at least in relation to property entitlements.
Indeed, part of the problem in obtaining spousal support for dependent
wives seems to be directly connected to the statutory entitlement to share
equally in property. According to this approach, once the accumulated
family property has been shared equally between the spouses, they are to
be regarded as individuals who should be (or shortly become) self-
51. See ibid. See also Rogerson, supra note 46.
52. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafterAndrews].
53. C.L. Smith, "Adding a Third Dimension: The Canadian Approach to Constitutional
Equality Guarantees" (1992) 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. 211.
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sufficient. In this way, family law reform has created new entitlements to
share in property, but with the corollary of reduced or non-existent
entitlement to ongoing financial support. As was argued earlier, however,
the fact that many divorcing couples have little or no property to divide
(as was clearly the case in Richardson) means that dependent wives may
receive no property and also fail in their claims for spousal support.
As well, there have been suggestions that family law cases present
difficulties for equality analysis because they are "highly fact-based and
involve the exercise of judicial discretion." 54 While these concerns are
real ones, there are other more significant reasons which, in my view,
explain the difficulty of using equality analysis in the family law context.
In spite of the Supreme Court's test of comparative disadvantage in the
Andrews case, it is arguable that the Court must still use a basic
comparator in the application of principles, and that the hidden compara-
tor is a male standard. In this way, it may be easier to use equality analysis
in contexts where women are engaged in activities which are most like
those generally undertaken by men; such an analysis explains why the
Court has used equality analysis more successfully in cases involving
women in the workplace: systemic discrimination in relation to non-
traditional work,55 sexual harassment,56 and arrangements for pregnancy
leave. 7 By contrast, equality analysis in the family law context requires
us to examine the underlying assumptions about the roles of husbands and
wives (and fathers and mothers) in families. In the context of family life,
where decisions are so often made to enhance the well-being of the family
unit as a whole, the task of applying equality analysis is a difficult one
because it depends on a sense of individualism and liberty which does not
take account of family ties.58 Moreover, the juxtaposition of equality
analysis at marriage breakdown cannot achieve its goals when members
of the family unit have behaved as part of a unit during the marriage, often
making decisions then which work to their detriment at marriage
breakdown.5 9
54. K. Busby, L. Fainstein & H. Penner, eds., Equality lssues in Family Law: Considerations
for Test Case Litigation (Winnipeg: Legal Research Institute of the University of Manitoba,
1990) at 3. As the authors noted, however, "one third of the inquiries received by LEAF's
national office concern cases raising family law issues."
55. Action Travail des Femmes v. C.N.R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114.
56. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 2152.
57. Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
58. For further analysis of this idea, see M.J. Mossman, "Individualism and Community:
Family as a Mediating Concept" in A. Hutchinson & L. Green, eds., Law and the Community:
The End ofIndividualism? (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 205.
59. See J.L. Knetsch, "Some Economic Implications of Matrimonial Property Rules" (1984)
34 U.T.L.J. 263.
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A good illustration of the complexity of using equality analysis in the
family law context is the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in
Moge v. Moge.60 The trial court determined that the wife had been
responsible (during about 20 years of marriage) for most of the household
work and had also worked part time in the evenings as a cleaner (about
6 hours per evening), while the husband worked as a welder but, in spite
of his claims to the contrary, did not contribute to the household
responsibilities. From the time of separation in 1973, the husband paid
about $150. per month in spousal support, in addition to child support. He
eventually applied to terminate his obligation for spousal support in 1989,
arguing that his former wife should have become self-sufficient or that
there was no causal connection between her dependency and the mar-
riage, pursuant to the test established in the trilogy. The Supreme Court
of Canada reviewed the requirements of the recent divorce legislation and
much of the literature on the feminization of poverty as well as the
jurisprudence, and concluded that her former husband should continue to
pay spousal support to Mrs. Moge in the amount of $150. As Madam
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 stated:
the general economic impact of divorce on women is a phenomenon the
existence of which cannot reasonably be questioned and should be
amenable to judicial notice .... While quantification will remain difficult
and fact related in each particular case, judicial notice should be taken of
such studies .... 61
The case represents an important contribution in terms of the recogni-
tion of spousal inequality at marriage breakdown. At the time of the
Supreme Court decision, Mrs. Moge was living under some hardship
while Mr. Moge had a new (working) partner and they owned a home; his
income was about $2000 per month. In spite of this outcome, however,
the case may not represent a significant reform to family law. In the first
place, the payment of spousal support in the amount of $150 is unlikely
to alleviate Mrs. Moge's hardship to any significant degree. More
importantly, however, the Supreme Court's decision expressly confined
60. [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 [hereinafter Moge].
61. Ibid. at 873-74. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 also referred to her earlier comments:
Before considering this evidence,... I feel that ajudge should not close his (orher) eyes
to the daily realities of present-day life .... The outcome of a family law proceeding is
... more dramatic [than cases about contract, insurance or tort]. Lack of income is felt
daily, and may affect the children's entire lives, aside from often working to the
detriment of the person who, though with adequate resources, deprives his family of
what they need. This, in my view, had to be said since such deficiencies are so often
encountered in the entering of evidence in family law cases.
See also Droit de lafamille-182, [1985] C.A. 92 at 95 (per L'Heureux-Dub6 J.).
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its application to cases which did not involve negotiated contracts
between the parties, leaving "for another day" the more general question
of the efficacy of the trilogy principles in the context of cases involving
a final settlement. Moreover, since the trilogy focused on the interpreta-
tion of the former Divorce Act, the Court clearly had an opportunity to
overrule the trilogy by interpreting the more recent legislation in a way
which promoted substantive equality between former spouses. Instead,
the Court chose to differentiate former wives without separation agree-
ments, to whom the Moge principles are applicable, from those who enter
into "freely-negotiated" final settlements, to whom the trilogy principles
apply.
Such a result, once again, demonstrates the incremental nature of
reform in the family law context; even when the Supreme Court of
Canada, using a substantive equality approach, focused directly on the
post-divorce problems of economic insecurity for women (and children),
its conclusion made an incremental, not fundamental, change. In my
view, part of the explanation for the limited usefulness of equality
analysis in reforming family law is the traditional (sometimes invisible)
division between the public and private spheres. Moreover, because
economic dependency in families also raises important questions about
responsibilities for those who are economically dependent, itis important
to consider this theme in relation to family law reform processes as well.
As Pamela Symes has argued, any new theory about family law must take
account of "changing attitudes and perceptions ... of dependence, 62 a
view which necessarily requires us to (re)examine the law's division
between public and private.
3. The impact of the public/private division and family law reform
The law reform process concerning property and inter-spousal support at
marriage breakdown suggests that the traditional dichotomy between
public and private remains an important feature for family law and policy.
Thus, some recent court decisions (such as the trilogy concerning inter-
spousal support) can be regarded as "consistent with the global trend
toward privatization" and "protection of the private sphere of the family
62. P. Symes, "Property, Power and Dependence: Critical Family Law" (1987) 14 J.L. &
Soc'y 199 at 200.
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from state intervention."63 Such an approach has been characterized by
Katherine O'Donovan as the standard liberal view that "intervention by
the state in family life is to be avoided if at all possible."
64
Yet this traditional view of law's non-intervention in private life has
also been challenged forcefully. Thus, there have been criticisms that the
public/private dichotomy is more legal fiction than reality, and that the
boundaries between public and private are either mutable or illusory (or
perhaps both).65 Moreover, itis clear thatpublic action is always involved
in defining boundaries which are considered private, so that, as Margaret
Thornton has suggested, "legislative and administrative activity [is
always] involved in constituting the private sphere in the character of the
family."66 Recognizing the law's role in constituting the public/private
dichotomy is thus regarded by critics like Nikolas Rose as the first step
in achieving fundamental family law reform:
The very notion of family privacy thus mystifies the extent to which the
family is constructed and controlled by the state and its agencies, and
obscures the power differences and conflicts amongst family members.
Reform proposals which operate in terms of the public/private divide, or
which seek to increase an unproblematical family privacy, are thus
fundamentally flawed.67
Feminist criticisms of the public/private dichotomy have also focused on
its parallels with other legal dichotomies, including that of male/female,
and have demonstrated the ways in which current social arrangements are
63. Bailey, supra note 48 at 616. As Bailey has argued, the ideas of formal equality and the
privatized family intersect to protect family decision-making from legal intervention: "The
privatized family, long exposed by feminists as a state-sanctioned arena for male abuse of
power, will not produce agreements consistent with the standards of fairness embodied in our
family laws because of the inequality of bargaining power between men and women."
64. K. O'Donovan, SexualDivisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985) at 14.
65. For an excellent analysis of these issues, see F.E. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497. See also F.E. Olsen, "The
Myth of State Intervention in the Family" (1985) 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 835; and "The Politics
of Family Law" (1984) 2 Law & Ineq. 1.
66. M. Thornton, "The Public/Private Dichotomy: Gendered and Discriminatory" (1991) 18
J.L. & Soc'y 448 at 449. See also J. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities
of and Limitations to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25
Osgoode Hall L.J 485.
67. N. Rose, "Beyond the Public/Private Division: Power and the Family" (1987) 14 J.L. &
Soc'y 61.
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supported by the maintenance of such (unequal) dichotomies.68 Such
criticism has also exposed the ways in which the process of defining the
public/private boundary operates to mask choices about legal interven-
tion or non-intervention, choices which are not neutral, but normative.
69
At the same time, some ambivalence about law's role is revealed in
feminist research which has documented the sometimes beneficial role of
state intervention in families for women.70 At the same time, however,
others like Jane Ursel have documented legal intervention in women's
lives (in the workplace and in the family) and suggested that it is
frequently contradictory and ambivalent in relation to reforms advocated
by women:
The double-edged sword of state intervention is located in its mandate to
mediate the contradiction between the demands of production and the
requirements of reproduction. This mandate implicates the state in com-
plex and contradictory dynamics that contain the dual possibilities of
progress... and exploitation .... In the context of these dual possibilities,
the state is a contested terrain. I understand the women's movement... as
a radical departure... in its refusal to tolerate 'reforms' constructed at the
expense of women, for example, the support-service marriage 'solution'
of the past.
7'
Such critiques of the public/private dichotomy offer a useful approach to
assessing family law reforms concerning property and inter-spousal
support. Indeed, these reforms might be characterized as "public" poli-
cies which try to ensure that the primary responsibility for dependent
family members remains the "private" responsibility of the family, after
marriage breakdown just as during the marriage. In such a context, the
provisions concerning property entitlement, for example, try to divide
68. Thornton, supra note 66 at 466. After considering issues of domestic violence, rape and
sexual harassment, Thornton argued (ibid.) that the existence of the public/private dichotomy
made the law more impervious to reform:
The central legitimating and ideological role played by law within the liberal state
ensures that it maintains the hegemony of masculinity through the seeming naturalness
of the public/private, male/female, mind/body dichotomies. The harms women suffer
by virtue of their sex/sexuality are so embedded within the private sphere qua family
qua corporeality that they have not been tractable to effective reform.
69. C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory"
(1982) 7 Signs 515; and "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635.
70. See, for example, N. Pupo, "Preserving Patriarchy: Women, the Family and the State" in
N. Mandell & A. Duffy, eds., Reconstructing the Canadian Family (Toronto: Butterworths,
1988) 207 at 211-12. Pupo also expressly referred to the work of F.F. Piven, "Women and the
State: Ideology, Power and the Welfare State" (1984) 14:2 Socialist Rev. 11.
71. J. Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family
(Toronto: Women's Press, 1992) at 298.
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family assets so as to foster some economic equality for both former
spouses. According to this analysis, the principles for inter-spousal
support can also be seen as encouraging self-sufficiency, with some
marginal assistance from former family members in needy cases. Thus,
while legal intervention is the means of achieving these objectives of
"public" policy, the effect of the reforms is the enforcement of "private"
family responsibilities for those who are dependent.
In this context, moreover, the enactment of support enforcement
legislation in several Canadian provinces further emphasizes the use of
"public" intervention to ensure "private" familial responsibilities. The
problem of non-payment of child support has frequently been character-
ized in terms of recalcitrance on the part of payor spouses, even though
there has been little empirical data available.72 After the initial legislation
was enacted in Ontario, however, the administrators enforcing the
legislation noted, with some frustration, that the enforcement process
often resulted in a long-overdue reconsideration of the circumstances of
the parties, concluding sometimes with a reduction in the amounts
required to be paid and the elimination of arrears.
In relation to child support especially, there is a need for ongoing
monitoring of both the needs of the child(ren) and the resources of the
payor spouse. Adjustments are quite typically required. Yet, sometimes
for good reasons, the payor spouse may not seek variation but rather
simply cease paying child support, pay irregularly or choose to pay less
than the amount ordered. And while it is seems clear that child support
payments have increased substantially with enforcement legislation, the
measures for implementing these obligations have become increasingly
elaborate. The process is clearly one of public legal intervention in
support of the enforcement of private familial obligations. Indeed, the
arrangements for enforcing child support now represent the investment
of considerable state resources, a matter which clearly factors in the
question of whether this is private or public action.
According to this analysis, the idea of family law reform as legal
intervention in the private sphere seems less compelling since it is clear
that the state may define not only the form of intervention but also the
boundaries between public and private. Indeed, it may be important to
question whether the definition of the boundary between public and
private may itself be preventing the adoption of initiatives which can
achieve more fundamental family law reform. If the problems of post-
72. For some examples, see Canadian Institute for Research, Matrimonial Support Failures:
Reasons, Profiles, and Perceptions of Individuals Involved (Edmonton: The Institute, 1981);
and F.M. Steel, "Maintenance Enforcement in Canada" (1985) 17 Ottawa L.R. 491.
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divorce economic security (especially for women and children) were
(re)conceptualized as public responsibilities, rather than obligations
which are private and familial, would it promote fundamental family law
reforms rather than merely incremental ones? Put a different way, if the
family were regarded as a "public" institution within society rather than
aprivate one, at leastin relation to issues of economic security atmarriage
breakdown, would law reform solutions be more likely to address the
structural and institutional features of marriage breakdown in ways
which might better address the tragic statistics concerning women and
children impoverished by the divorce process?
Acknowledging the public role of the family in providing economic
security for dependent family members, both during a marriage as well
as after marriage breakdown, would necessitate some recognition that
dependency is, after all, a fact of life for most of us. As children, we were
all dependent and many of us will again be dependent in old age, or
because we are unable to work, either through infirmity or perhaps
because global restructuring of the economy means that there are fewer
jobs that ensure economic independence. Canadian public policy has
traditionally used legal intervention to ameliorate dependency caused by
age, infirmity or loss of employment, even though there may be familial
resources in some of these cases which are also available to support
dependents. Thus, it is interesting to speculate whether and how public
policy measures might also support legal intervention at marriage break-
down to assure dependent women and children a basic level of economic
well-being. Such arrangements have been recommended in the United
Kingdom7 and have been partially implemented in Australia where
reforms relating to the enforcement of child support have been integrated
into the income tax system.74
Thus, (re)conceptualizing family law reform as a matter of public
policy rather than the enforcement of private familial obligations permits
us to ask different questions about the goals of family law reform efforts.
It also overcomes the problem of the public/private dichotomy that has
been used in the past to limit the extent of intervention in ways which have
73. See Justice B. Wilson, "The Variation of Support Orders" in R. Abella & C. L'Heureux-
Dub6, eds., Family Law: Dimensions of Justice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) about the
Report of the Committee on One Parent Families (the Finer Committee). See also M.J.
Mossman, "Family Law and Social Welfare in Canada" in I. Bemier&A. LaJoieeds., Family
Law and Social Welfare Legislation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1986) 43.
74. See M. Harrison etal., Payingforthe Children: ParentandEmployerExperience ofStage
One ofAustralia's Child Support Scheme (Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies,
1991).
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placed women and children at an economic disadvantage after marriage
breakdown. A recognition that no-fault divorce permits some married
persons to exit from existing relationships andform new ones (men, more
often than women and children) means that we need structural and
institutional arrangements which ensure the economic well-being of
dependent family members after marriage breakdown. In this way, it is
necessary to challenge the myth of the family as a private sphere, along
with the use of formal equality concepts and the inherent limits of family
law reform, to achieve fundamental reform, reform which can assure
economic security for dependents on marriage breakdown and thus
confront poverty statistics arising out of divorce in a more meaningful
way.
III. Toward Fundamental Family Law Reform
The paradox of family law reform-that there has been so much activity
on the part of legislators, courts, law reform commissions and other
interested groups, but that economic security remains a problem for so
many dependent women and children after marriage breakdown-is not
easily addressed. Women and children are still "running hard to stand
still. 75 In spite of all the reform activity in the past two decades, the
resolution of post-divorce economic relationships has not been accom-
plished successfully. Thus, in thinking about the underlying themes of
family law reform (the inherent limits of law reform activity within the
legal system, problems of formal equality in the family law context, and
the myth of the division between public and private spheres) it is
important to confront the fact that family law in Canada has never been
understood as a problem about justice.
The recent report of the CBA Task Force on Gender Equality in the
Legal Profession documented the difficulties experienced by all those
involved in the administration of family law matters. The report ex-
plained that members of the Task Force had become interested in
problems in the family law areabecause of the frequency with which such
concerns were raised by lawyers, law teachers and judges who were
interviewed in the course of its inquiry. The Task Force concluded that
it was important to address these concerns as a means of assessing the
implementation of public policy about families in the administration of
justice in Canada. As the Task Force stated the issue:
75. For a recent account of other problems of women in the family law system, see Family
Violence = Family Law Violence (Toronto: Mothers on Trial, 1993).
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Canadian governments state that they value children highly; Canadian
lawmakers legislate widely to protect children, to provide for the support
of single parents, and to regulate the division of family assets upon
marriage breakdown; family legal aid schemes have been established to
enable those who have been financially disadvantaged by their commit-
ment to family and children to have access to the rights guaranteed in our
legislation. Are these endeavours backed up by practical commitments?
Are the lofty phrases of our legislators reflected in the concrete experi-
ences of our family lawyers and litigants?
7 6
The Task Force answered these questions in the negative:
In reviewing the evidence about the practice of family law in Canada, the
Task Force found that the reality fell far short of our aspirations and our
ideals. Lawyers struggling to provide justice to litigants in this area
received little support despite verbal assurances from many levels of
government. In the cynical words of one female lawyer, governments
provide "all possible aid short of actual help."77
As the Task Force further documented the problems, moreover, the
inescapable conclusion was that families, family relationships and indi-
viduals' well-being as family members were not a high priority for
governments, a situation reflected in the difficult context of the practice
of family law for lawyers and judges, as well as for clients and litigants.
In such a context, there is a further reason to (re)think family law
reform in terms of fundamental, not incremental, change, in terms of
substantive equality goals rather than formal equality objectives, and in
the context of public policy about post-divorce economic security rather
than the privatization of responsibility for dependent family members.
Such an approach takes seriously Susan Moller Okin' s assertion that "the
family ... must be just if we are to have a just society."78 According to
Okin, it is in the family where we first learn to have a sense of individual
identity in relationship with others, the basis for both independence and
connection, ethical ideas which are essential in ajust society. In this way,
family "conversations" represent the seeds of public and constitutional
discourse; according to Okin, unless our families are just, there is little
possibility for public discourse which both embraces our similarities and
respects our differences.
79
76. Canadian Bar Association, Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession,
Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association, 1993) at 203.
77. Ibid.
78. S. Moller Okn, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989) at 14.
79. For further discussion of the relationship between "family conversations" and constitu-
tional discourse, see M.J. Mossman, "The Family in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson"
(1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 115.
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In such a context, we need to use the opportunity for fundamental
family law reform to find an imaginative revisioning of ourselves as
individual members of families and as members of the Canadian
community.
